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Abstract
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice
function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents’
private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function can be
implemented by a mechanism in equilibrium, then there exists a direct mechanism
that can truthfully implement it.
This paper aims to propose a failure of the revelation principle. At first we point
out that in any game the format of each agent’s strategy is either an abstract
message or a real action. For any given social choice function, if the mechanism
which implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium has action-format strategies,
then “honest and obedient” will not be an equilibrium strategy in the corresponding
direct mechanism. Consequently, the revelation principle fails.
Key words: Mechanism design; Revelation principle.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1–4], there are one designer
and some agents labeled as 1, · · · , I. 1 Suppose that the designer would like
to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for
each possible profile of agents’ types, and each agent’s type is modeled as his
privacy. In order to implement a social choice function in equilibrium, the
designer constructs a mechanism which specifies each agent’s feasible strategy
∗ Corresponding author.
Email address: 18621753457@163.com (Haoyang Wu).
1 In this paper, the designer is always denoted as “She”, and the agent is denoted
as “He”.
set (i.e., the allowed actions of each agent) and an outcome function (i.e., a
rule for how agents’ actions get turned into a social choice).
The revelation principle is an important theorem in mechanism design theory.
It asserts that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism
in equilibrium, then it is truthfully implementable. So far, there have been
several criticisms on the revelation principle: Bester and Strausz [5] pointed
out that the revelation principle may fail because of imperfect commitmen-
t;Epstein and Peters [6] proposed that the revelation principle fails in situa-
tions where several mechanism designers compete against each other. Kephart
and Conitzer [7] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless and mis-
reporting is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.
Different from these criticisms on the revelation principle, this paper aims to
propose another failure of the revelation principle. We point out that each
agent’s strategy is of two formats, i.e., a message or an action. Indeed, the
format of each agent’s strategy plays an important role to the correctness of
revelation principle. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the
motivation of this paper, Section 3 proposes the main result. In Section 4, we
propose the bug in the proof of revelation principle given by Mas-Colell et al
[1]. Section 5 draws conclusions. Notations and proof about mechanism design
theory and the revelation principle are given in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2,
which are cited from MWG’s book [1].
2 Motivation
Note 1: In any game, the format of each agent’s strategy is either an abstract
message or a real action. 2
It should be emphasized that only in some restricted cases (e.g., chess, war
simulation game and so on) can each agent’s strategy be described as pure
information and represented by an abstract message. On the other hand, in
many practical cases each agent’s strategy cannot be described as pure infor-
mation but must be described as a real action. For example, a war simulation
game only contains military plans of players, but a real war contains military
actions of armies.
2 Although Note 1 looks naive, it is not trivial. The reason why we emphasize the
two formats of strategy is that the revelation principle will not hold for the case of
action-format strategies. We will deeply discuss it in Section 3. For simplification, in
the following discussions we simply assume that in any game each agent’s strategy
is of the same format, i.e., we omit the case in which some agents’ strategies are
message-format and other agents’ strategies are action-format.
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An interesting example is the auction. At first sight each bidder’s bid is pure
information and looks like a message-format strategy, however in many prac-
tical cases only the bid information itself is not enough to be a full strategy:
besides announcing the message-format bid, the winner must perform a re-
al action (e.g., paying money to the auctioneer) in order to really finish the
auction. Hence, in many practical cases, the auction is an action-format game.
Next we will deeply investigate the distinction of two formats of strategy.
2.1 Case 1: Mechanism with message-format strategies
Definition 1: A message-format strategy of an agent in a mechanism is a
strategy represented by an abstract message, which only contains pure infor-
mation and does not need to be performed realistically. For example, let us
consider a chess game, then each player’s strategy is his message-format plan
about how to play chess.
Definition 2: Given a social choice function f , suppose a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements it in equilibrium with message-format strate-
gies. To clearly describe the case of message-format strategies, we denote
each strategy set Si as Mi, and each agent i’s strategy function is denoted
as mi(·) : Θi → Mi, in which Θi is agent i’s type set. The outcome function
g(·) is denoted as gm(·) : M1 × · · · × MI → X. Hence, the mechanism Γ is
denoted as Γm = (M1, · · · ,MI , gm(·)). The game induced by Γm is denoted as
Gm, which works in a one-stage manner:
Step 1: By using strategy functions (m1(·), · · · ,mI(·)), agents 1, · · · , I with
private types (θ1, · · · , θI) send messages (m1(θ1), · · · ,mI(θI)) to the designer.
Here, there is no disclosure of each agent i’s true type θi.
3
Step 2: The mechanism Γm yields the outcome gm(m1(θ1), · · · ,mI(θI)).
Here, the input parameters of the outcome function gm(·) are message-format
strategies m1(θ1), · · · ,mI(θI).
Definition 3: Suppose the game Gm has an equilibrium (m
∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)).
Consider this equilibrium, there is a compound mapping from agents’ possi-
ble types (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) ∈ Θ into the outcome gm(m
∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I)), which is
equal to f(θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I). Based on the compound mapping, we define a corre-
sponding direct mechanism Γ̄m = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , gm(m
∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·))).
Note 2: The outcome function of the constructed direct mechanism Γ̄m must
be the compound mapping gm(m
∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)) instead of the social choice
function f(·), although the two functions are outcome-equivalent. The reason
3 To clearly describe the true type of each agent i, we denote it as θi, and any
possible type of agent i is denoted as θ̂i ∈ Θi.
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is straightforward: if the outcome function of Γ̄m is simply written as f(·),
then this naive direct mechanism will be irrelevant to the mechanism Γm =
(M1, · · · ,MI , gm(·)), and hence cannot implement f(·) at all.
Definition 4: The direct mechanism Γ̄m induces a one-stage direct game Ḡm
as follows:
Step 1: Each agent i with private type θi individually reports a message-format
type θ̂i ∈ Θi, here θ̂i does not need to be equal to agent i’s true type θi.
Step 2: By using the equilibrium strategy functionsm∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·), the direct
mechanism Γ̄m calculates m
∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I), and then yields the outcome
gm(m
∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I)).
Note 3: It should be emphasized that the calculated resultsm∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I)
are pure information. Only when each agent i’s strategy set Si is message-
format can the calculated results be legal message-format parameters of the
outcome function gm(·).
Note 4: By Definition 3, (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)) is the equilibrium of the game
Gm, in which each agent i with private type θi will choose m
∗
i
(θi). Therefore,
by Definition 4 in the direct game Ḡm each agent i will find truth-telling
θ̂i = θi to be the optimal strategy given that all other agents tell the truth
θ̂−i = θ−i. Thus, for the case of message-format strategies, truth-telling is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Ḡm. This conclusion means that the
revelation principle holds when each agent’s strategy is of message format.
2.2 Case 2: Mechanism with action-format strategies
Definition 5: An action-format strategy of an agent in a mechanism is a
strategy represented by a realistic action, which should be performed by him-
self practically. For example, let us consider a tennis game, then each player’s
strategy is his realistic action of playing tennis, but not any informational plan
of how to play tennis.
Definition 6: Given a social choice function f , suppose a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements it in equilibrium with action-format strategies.
To clearly describe the case of action-format strategies, we denote each strate-
gy set Si as Ai, and each agent i’s strategy function is denoted as ai(·) : Θi →
Ai. The outcome function g(·) is denoted as ga(·) : A1×· · ·×AI → X. Hence,
the mechanism Γ is denoted as Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)). The game induced
by Γa is denoted as Ga, which works in a one-stage manner:
Step 1: By using strategy function ai(·), each agent i (i = 1, · · · , I) with pri-
vate type θi performs the action-format strategy ai(θi), which is observed by
the designer. Here, each agent i’s private type θi is not disclosed.
Step 2: The mechanism Γa yields the outcome ga(a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI)).
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Here, the input parameters of the outcome function ga(·) are action-format
strategies a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI). Obviously, if some agent i with private type θi
only declares a plan of action ai(θi) but does not realistically perform the
action, then Ga will not work at all.
Definition 7: Suppose the game Ga has an equilibrium (a
∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)).
Consider this equilibrium, there is a compound mapping from agents’ possible
types (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) into the outcome ga(a
∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · , a
∗
I
(θ̂I)), which is equal to
f(θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I). Based on the compound mapping, we define a corresponding
direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·))). 4
Definition 8: According to Myerson [2], the direct mechanism Γ̄a induces a
multistage direct game Ḡa as follows:
Step 1: Each agent i with private type θi individually reports a message-format
type θ̂i ∈ Θi, here θ̂i does not need to be equal to agent i’s true type θi.
Step 2: The designer returns a suggestion to each agent i, here the suggestion is
just the message-format description of action a∗
i
(θ̂i) ∈ Ai. In order to represent
the suggestion’s format more clearly, we denote the suggestion as am
i
(θ̂i);
Step 3: Each agent i individually performs an action-format strategy âi ∈ Ai.
Here each agent i does not need to be “obedient”, i.e., âi does not need to
obey am
i
(θ̂i).
Step 4: After all action-format strategies (â1, · · · , âI) have been performed,
the direct mechanism Γ̄a yields the outcome ga(â1, · · · , âI).
Note 5: Different from Step 2 in Definition 4, here the action-format strategies
(â1, · · · , âI) cannot be calculated by the designer but must be performed by
each agent realistically.
Note 6: Consider Step 1 in Definition 8, each agent is required to report
a type, either honestly or dishonestly. Note that choosing to be honest or
dishonest is each agent’s private choice and cannot be directly observed by
the designer. Since no agent will be punished even if being found false-telling,
of course no agent is willing to disclose his privacy unless truth-telling is
his strictly optimal choice. Put differently, if the outcome of truth-telling is
equivalent to the outcome of false-telling, then each agent will certainly prefer
false-telling, since false-telling always protects his privacy.
Note 7: Consider Step 3 in Definition 8, each agent performs an action-format
strategy, either obediently or disobediently. Note that choosing to be obedient
or disobedient is each agent’s open choice and can be directly observed by the
designer. However, the designer can neither control any agent’s decision nor
punish any disobedient agent.
4 Similar to Note 2, here the outcome function of the constructed direct mechanism
Γ̄a should be the compound mapping ga(a
∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)) instead of f(·).
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3 Main results
Consider the multistage direct game Ḡa induced by Γ̄a given in Definition 8.
Myerson [2] claims that the strategy “honest and obedient” is the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the direct game Ḡa: i.e., each agent i not only honestly
discloses his private type in Step 1 (i.e., θ̂i = θi), but also obeys the designer’s
suggestion in Step 3 (i.e., âi = a
m
i
(θi)). However, in this section we will point
out that Myerson’s conclusion does not hold when each agent’s strategy is of
an action format.
Proposition 1: For a given social choice function f , suppose there is a mech-
anism Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)) that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, in which each agent’s strategy is of an action format. Then f will not be
truthfully implementable, i.e., in the multistage direct game Ḡa induced by
the corresponding direct mechanism Γ̄a, “honest and obedient” is no longer
the equilibrium strategy.
Proof: Suppose a mechanism Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)) implements the social
choice function f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then by Definition 6 it in-
duces a one-stage game Ga. Let the equilibrium strategy of Ga be denoted as
(a∗
1
(θ1), · · · , a
∗
I
(θI)). According to Definition 8, there are two possible cases for
agents 1, · · · , I in Step 1 of the multistage game Ḡa:
Case 1: Each agent is honest and obedient
Suppose each agent i chooses to be “honest” in Step 1 of the direct game Ḡa,
i.e., θ̂i = θi, then in Step 2 of Ḡa the designer’s suggestion will be a
m
i
(θi). Since
the equilibrium strategy of each agent i in Ga is a
∗
i
, the optimal choice of each
agent i in Step 3 of Ḡa is to be “obedient”, i.e., obey the suggestion a
m
i
(θi) and
perform the action-format strategy a∗
i
(θi). In Step 4, the final outcome will
be ga(a
∗
1
(θ1), · · · , a
∗
I
(θI)). Note that each agent i’s private type is disclosed in
this case.
Case 2: At lease one agent is dishonest and disobedient
Suppose at least one agent i chooses to be “dishonest” in Step 1 of the direct
game Ḡa, i.e., θ̂i ̸= θi, then in Step 2 of Ḡa the designer’s suggestion to agent
i will be am
i
(θ̂i) ̸= a
m
i
(θi). Since the equilibrium of Ga is (a
∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)), the
optimal choice of agent i in Step 3 of Ḡa is to be “disobedient” (i.e., not to
obey the suggestion am
i
(θ̂i) but to perform the action-format strategy a
∗
i
(θi),
which is consistent with his true type θi). Note that agent i’s private type
is not disclosed in this case. Furthermore, Case 2 can be generalized to each
agent i as follows.
Case 3: Each agent is dishonest and disobedient
Suppose each agent i chooses to be “dishonest” in Step 1 of the direct game Ḡa
(i.e. reporting a false type θ̂i ̸= θi), and chooses to be “disobedient” in Step 3
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of Ḡa (i.e., performing the action-format strategy a
∗
i
(θi), which is inconsistent
with the designer’s suggestion am
i
(θ̂i) but consistent with each agent i’s private
type). By Note 7, although the designer can find each agent i is disobedient
in Step 4 of Ḡa, she has to yield the outcome ga(a
∗
1
(θ1), · · · , a
∗
I
(θI)).
To sum up, “dishonest and disobedient” is outcome-equivalent to “honest and
obedient” from each agent’s perspective. According to Note 6, each agent i
will certainly prefer “dishonest and disobedient”. Therefore, “dishonest and
disobedient” is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct game Ḡa, and the
final outcome is ga(a
∗
1
(θ1), · · · , a
∗
I
(θI)), which is equal to f(theta1), · · · , θI).
Consequently, f cannot be truthfully implemented in Bayesian Nash equi-
librium, and hence the revelation principle does not hold when each agent’s
strategy is of an action format. ✷
4 Bug in MWG’s proof of the revelation principle
Here we cite formula (23.D.3) from Appendix 2 as follow. For all i and all
θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θ̂i), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi], (23.D.3)
for all θ̂i ∈ Θi.
When each agent’s strategy is of an action format, formula (23.D.3) should be
rewritten as follows.
Eθ
−i
[ui(ga(a
∗
i
(θi), a
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(ga(a
∗
i
(θ̂i), a
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
It can be seen that the item of outcome in each agent i’s utility ui is yielded
by the compound function ga(a
∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)) : Θ1 × · · · × ΘI → X. The
processing sequence of the compound function is that at first each agent i
performs his action-format strategy a∗
i
(·), and then the designer performs the
outcome function ga(·). Note that during this process each agent’s true type
θi is not disclosed.
Note that (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)) is the equilibrium strategy of the game Ga induced
by the mechanism Γa, thus ga(a
∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · , a
∗
I
(θ̂I)) = f(θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) for all pos-
sible θ̂i ∈ Θi. However, by Proposition 1, when each agent’s strategy is of an
action format, f is not truthfully implementable: i.e., it is impossible to con-
struct a direct mechanism Γ̄ = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·))) to implement
f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consequently, formula (23.D.4) cannot be
yielded from formula (23.D.3). This is just the bug in MWG’s proof.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose that in any game there are two formats of strategy
(i.e., an abstract message or a real action). In Section 2.1 we point out that
the revelation principle holds when each agent’s strategy is of message format.
However, when each agent’s strategy is of an action format, in the multistage
direct game induced by the direct mechanism, “dishonest and disobedient” is
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the revelation principle fails when
each agent’s strategy is of action format.
Appendix 1: Notations and Definitions
Let us consider a setting with one designer and I agents indexed by i =
1, · · · , I. Each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines his pref-
erence over elements in an outcome set X. The set of possible types for agent
i is denoted as Θi. The vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from
set Θ = Θ1 × · · · × ΘI) according to probability density φ(·), and each agent
i’s utility function over the outcome x ∈ X given his type θi is ui(x, θi) ∈ R.
A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I strategy sets S1, · · · , SI
and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X. The mechanism combined
with possible types (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI), the probability density φ(·) over the possible
realizations of θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · × ΘI , and utility functions (u1, · · · , uI) defines
a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The strategy function of each
agent i in the game induced by Γ is a private function si(θi) : Θi → Si. Each
strategy set Si contains agent i’s possible strategies. The outcome function g(·)
describes the rule for how agents’ strategies get turned into a social choice.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ1 × · · · ×ΘI → X that, for
each possible profile of the agents’ types θ1, · · · , θI , assigns a collective choice
f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X.
A strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, ŝi ∈ Si, there
exists
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(g(ŝi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the social choice function
f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
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A direct mechanism is a mechanism Γ̄ = (S̄1, · · · , S̄I , ḡ(·)) in which S̄i = Θi
for all i and ḡ(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. 5 The social choice function f(·) is
truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive
compatible) if s̄∗
i
(θi) = θi for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the direct mechanism Γ̄ = (S̄1, · · · , S̄I , ḡ(·)), in which S̄i = Θi,
ḡ = f . That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θi ∈ Θi, θ̂i ∈ Θi, there exists
Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θ̂i, θ−i), θi)|θi]. (1)
Appendix 2: Proof of the revelation principle
Proposition 23.D.1 [1]: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash E-
quilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that
implements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
then there exists a profile of strategies s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)) such that
g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ, and for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(g(ŝi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi], (23.D.2)
for all ŝi ∈ Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θ̂i), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi], (23.D.3)
for all θ̂i ∈ Θi. Since g(s
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ, (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θ̂i, θ−i), θi)|θi], (23.D.4)
for all θ̂i ∈ Θi. But, this is precisely the condition for f(·) to be truthfully
implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. ✷
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